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The	Temer	government	in	Brazil	lacks	the	legitimacy
required	to	reform	its	way	back	to	recovery
A	coordinated	political	effort	to	move	toward	higher	labour	productivity,	higher	valued-added
activities,	and	a	solid	foundation	of	public	education	and	health	services	can	only	be	achieved
through	elections	and	negotiations	between	legitimate	representatives,	writes	Mark	S.	Langevin.
Brazil’s	compounding	crisis	swirls	the	Lava	Jato	corruption	scandal	with	a	devastating	recession	to
create	a	toxic	political	mix	that	has	paralysed	the	country.	Poverty	and	unemployment	haunt	the
many	millions	in	Brazil	who	remember	the	boom	but	can	only	hope	to	survive	the	bust.	Windows	of
opportunity	are	closing	as	Brazilians	survey	the	ruins	left	behind	by	Lava	Jato,	fiscal	and	exchange-rate	populism,
and	bad	governance.	The	government	of	President	Michel	Temer,	architect	of	his	predecessor	Dilma	Rousseff’s
impeachment	last	year,	fights	on	without	popular	support	amidst	a	whirlwind	of	corruption	allegations.	The
economy	limps	along	without	any	prospect	of	significant	increases	in	consumer	demand	or	productive	investment
for	the	foreseeable	future.
For	now	Brazilians	await	the	2018	elections	with	caution	and	recognize	that	the	crisis	is	well	beyond	the	reach	of
any	charismatic,	well-intentioned	“Saviour	of	the	Fatherland”.	Instead,	political	and	economic	reforms	are	needed
to	sail	towards	a	sustainable	recovery,	but	is	the	Temer	government	in	a	position	to	provide	them?
President	Michel	Temer	at	a	signing	ceremony	for	the	Good	Governance	Pact	(adapted	from
Anderson	Riedel,	CC	BY	2.0)
The	sources	of	the	crisis
The	first	signs	of	Brazil’s	compounding	crisis	emerged	in	June	2013	with	sizeable	marches	and	demonstrations
involving	the	“free	bus	pass”	movement.	As	they	spread	across	Brazil’s	major	cities,	they	soon	evolved	into	anti-
corruption	and	anti-government	protests.
The	mobilisations	quickly	“flipped”	Dilma	Rousseff	from	being	a	popular	president	to	one	scrambling	for	a	new
political	recipe,	which	ultimately	consisted	of	five	key	ingredients:
1.	 greater	fiscal	responsibility
2.	 investment	of	all	pre-salt	petroleum	royalties	in	education
3.	 provision	of	foreign	doctors	to	satisfy	growing	demand	for	medical	services	in	Brazil’s	poorest	regions
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4.	 calling	of	a	constituent	assembly	to	reform	the	political	system	and	achieve	greater	accountability
5.	 increased	investment	in	public	transport	(as	demanded	in	the	original	2013	mobilisations)
The	constituent-assembly	proposal	and	subsequent	plebiscite	aimed	to	reform	campaign	finance,	end	secret
votes	by	congress,	and	create	congressional	districts	to	hold	Federal	Deputies	to	a	higher	degree	of
accountability.	But	the	idea	was	mistrusted	by	protesters,	rejected	by	congress,	neglected	by	her	own	party,	and
left	to	melt	away	amidst	the	political	polarisation	surrounding	the	2014	presidential	and	congressional	elections
and	the	Lava	Jato	investigations	and	prosecutions.	This	may	have	been	the	moment	to	fix	Brazil,	but	the
prevailing	winds	of	change	swept	away	any	possibility	of	compromise	and	reform.
Presidential	and	congressional	job	approval
Four	years	later	reform	is	dead	in	the	water,	with	little	hope	of	holding	congress	accountable	after	two-thirds	of	its
members	voted	to	oust	Dilma	in	2016.	President	Temer’s	job	approval	rating	is	at	an	historic	low	with	only	seven
percent	of	Brazilians	finding	that	his	administration	is	good	or	very	good.	Temer	has	also	been	indicted	by	the
Attorney	General	Rodrigo	Janot	and	will	face	a	vote	in	the	lower	House	of	Deputies	on	whether	to	initiate
proceedings	for	his	removal.
But	the	Brazilian	Congress	itself	is	under	suspicion.	Forty-four	current	and	former	Federal	Deputies	and	Senadors
have	been	indicted	by	the	Lava	Jato	prosecutions,	while	there	are	238	Brazilian	congressional	representatives
from	the	largest	political	parties	that	have	criminal,	electoral,	or	corruption	charges	pending	in	the	Supreme	Court.
The	former	President	of	the	House	of	Deputies,	Eduardo	Cunha	(of	Temer’s	PMDB	party),	is	now	behind	bars	for
his	participation	in	the	Lava	Jato	scheme.	Understandably,	few	Brazilians	trust	congress	to	do	the	right	thing,	and
many	conclude	that	the	legislative	branch	is	protecting	itself	from	criminal	investigations.
The	compounding	crisis	and	plummeting	approval	for	the	executive	and	legislative	branches	of	government	call
into	question	the	legitimacy	of	policymaking	in	Brasilia.	Yet,	the	existence	of	a	vocal	“Fora	Temer”	movement	has
not	stopped	the	president	and	congress	from	passing	several	economic	reforms	that	some	argue	are	essential	for
recovery.	These	reforms	are	both	symbolic	and	substantial,	being	targeted	to	please	investors	and	rating
agencies.
They	include	the	passage	of	a	constitutional	amendment	that	caps	federal	spending,	a	labour	reform	that	reduces
workers’	protections	and	weakens	labour	unions,	new	airline	regulations	that	permit	checked-baggage	charges,
and	a	tax	rise	on	gasoline,	all	in	the	name	of	fiscal	stability	and	economic	recovery.	Temer	is	also	pushing	for	a
new	law	that	would	open	up	large	tracts	of	the	Jamanxim	national	forest	reserve	to	the	private	sector.
Overall,	the	reforms	serve	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	state	and	promote	an	economic	strategy	orientated	towards
the	market	and	a	model	of	global	integration	based	on	agricultural	and	low	value-added	industrial	exports,	placing
Brazil	on	the	lowest	rungs	of	global	value	chains.	This	agenda	might	make	Brazil	more	competitive,	but	it	will	do
little	to	increase	the	productivity	of	most	Brazilians.
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A	protester	mans	a	burning	barricade	at	a	labour-reform	and	Fora	Temer	protest	in	Sao	Paulo
(Paulo	Pinto,	CC	BY	2.0)
Failing	to	reform	to	recover
Temer’s	reform	agenda	is	ad	hoc	and	his	government	features	few	supporters	of	public	education	and	health
services,	environmental	protection,	or	reindustrialisation.	Instead,	Temer’s	strategy	appears	to	focus	on	his	own
political	survival	and	is	characterised	by	large-scale	logrolling	(vote	trading)	in	order	to	preserve	a	majority
capable	of	passing	some	reforms	and	protecting	him	from	impeachment.
From	this	perspective,	a	willingness	to	section	off	the	Jamanxim	forest	reserve	can	be	seen	as	a	means	of
securing	votes	from	the	agribusiness	caucus	so	as	to	guarantee	his	survival.	On	the	flip	side,	a	gasoline	tax	hike
reassures	Wall	Street	that	the	government’s	revenue	targets	will	be	met,	even	though	the	measure	will	likely	slow
recovery.	If	one	could	criticise	the	Dilma	government	for	economic-policy	volatility,	the	same	must	be	said	of
Temer.
Clearly,	Temer	has	tried	to	do	more	for	business	interests	than	his	predecessor,	but	it	is	uncertain	whether	his
mix	of	reforms	and	logrolling	can	drive	an	economic	recovery.	According	to	the	OECD’s	June	2017	economic
forecast	for	Brazil:
“The	economy	is	finally	emerging	from	a	severe	and	protracted	recession.	Still,	the	recovery	is
projected	to	be	weak	and	slow.	Consumer	and	business	confidence	is	rising	and	agricultural	exports
started	the	year	on	a	strong	footing.	However,	unemployment	is	projected	to	decline	only	towards	the
end	of	this	year,	and	then	to	fall	only	gradually.	Inflation	has	decreased	significantly,	partly	due	to
lower	demand,	and	is	projected	to	close	the	year	below	the	4.5%	inflation	target.	Inequality	remains
high.”
The	question	is	whether	this	tentative	recovery	will	lead	to	greater	consumer	demand,	investment	and
productivity.	Wages	and	unemployment	are	expected	to	lag,	creating	a	drag	on	the	economic	recovery	that
investors	are	waiting	for.	Currently	the	unemployment	rate	is	13.3	percent	with	some	13.8	million	idle	workers.
Temer	and	advocates	of	his	labour	reform	argue	that	greater	labour-market	flexibility	generates	employment,	but
they	also	agree	that	such	an	effect	takes	years	to	achieve.
In	the	short	term,	Brazilian	workers	will	earn	less	and	have	fewer	employment	opportunities.	These	outcomes
have	pulled	down	inflation,	triggering	interest	rate	decreases,	but	they	also	prevent	a	full	economic	recovery.
Fiscal	stability	and	economic	recovery	demand	an	active	employment	policy,	but	for	now	the	only	job	Temer	is
worried	about	is	his	own.
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Neither	is	foreign	investment	picking	up	the	slack.	Santander	Trade	Portal	notes	that:
“Foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	into	Brazil	boomed	over	the	period	2009-2011,	but	has	been	slowing
down	ever	since.	After	reaching	USD	73	billion	in	2014,	FDI	inflows	to	Brazil	declined	to	USD	64	billion
in	2015.	The	flows	continued	to	decline	in	2016,	reaching	USD	58	billion.”
Brazilian	assets	are	cheap	so	medium-	to	long-term	investors	are	willing	to	take	the	plunge,	but	many	foreign
investors	remain	cautious	about	opportunities	created	by	the	recession.	At	this	juncture,	Temer	and	his	allies	lack
the	legitimacy	to	negotiate	the	passage	of	coherent	reforms	that	would	achieve	greater	political	accountability,
address	the	fiscal	crisis,	and	build	a	sustainable	foundation	for	economic	recovery.	Instead,	the	government	is
managing	an	incoherent	reform	agenda	while	defending	the	president	against	the	Attorney	General’s	charges
and	mounting	discontent	within	his	own	coalition.	Foreign	investors	cannot	bail	out	the	president	or	his	majority	in
congress.
Temer’s	political	survival	and	his	peculiar	mix	of	economic	and	fiscal	policy	reforms	cannot	repair	Brazil	or	lead	to
a	sustainable	economic	recovery.	Global	demand	for	Brazilian	exports	may	drive	greater	investment	and
employment,	but	a	coordinated	political	effort	to	move	toward	higher	labour	productivity,	higher	valued-added
activities,	and	a	solid	foundation	of	public	education	and	health	services	can	only	be	achieved	through	elections
and	negotiations	between	legitimate	representatives.
For	now	Brazil	is	stuck	in	the	mud,	and	its	people	will	have	to	wait	for	new	elections	to	lift	them	out	of	it.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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